14_TYLER_FINAL.DOC

9/18/2009 11:08:00 AM

GOVERNING PLURALISTIC SOCIETIES
TOM TYLER*
I
INTRODUCTION
The problem of how to hold diverse groups together is central to many
modern pluralistic societies. The article by Mnookin and Verbeke discusses the
key issues that emerge in such efforts, using Belgium as an example.1 The
question, well illustrated by the linguistic and cultural complexities of Belgium,
is what social glue can hold together such diverse groups? In this comment, I
discuss several social-psychological contributions to the question of managing
diversity, with the hope that they provide some ideas useful to this general
discussion.
Societies can be held together in many ways. Historically, many groups were
linked by a common history, common ethnicity, and common religious and
social values. These societies shared a unified set of norms dictating right and
wrong. Other groups have been held together by charismatic leaders who
present a unifying vision. But modern pluralistic society, uniquely, accepts a
diversity of views about what is appropriate and reasonable, which makes these
forms of authority difficult to enact. The form of authority emerging in western
democratic states has been, instead, authority based upon the processes of
government: people recognize democratic procedures as legitimate and defer to
authorities because of the manner in which they manage. This allows authority
to be widely accepted in the face of diverse moral, cultural, or religious
traditions. The key to the success of such a strategy is that legitimacy is based
upon the fairness of the procedures used by authorities to govern rather than
upon the substance of their decisions. This allows authorities to make decisions
that are widely accepted even by those who disagree with them.
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1. Robert Mnookin & Alain Verbeke, Persistent Nonviolent Conflict with No Reconciliation:
The Flemish and Walloons in Belgium, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151 (Spring 2009).
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WHAT MAKES A PROCEDURE FAIR?
What makes a procedure fair in the eyes of the public? Four factors
dominate evaluations of procedural justice.2 First, people want the opportunity
to state their cases to the authorities.3 Second, people expect neutrality of the
authority’s decision-making process.4 People also value the quality of their
interpersonal treatment by the authorities, that is, whether they feel they are
being treated with dignity and respect by legal authorities.5 Finally, people focus
on cues that communicate information about the intentions and character of the
legal authorities with whom they are dealing—trustworthiness.6
Yuen Huo and I have directly compared the influence of these four factors
and of outcome favorability and procedural-justice judgments on people’s
overall rating of their personal experiences with legal authorities.7 The results
indicated that each of the four factors was at least five times as important as
outcome favorability in shaping judgments about the procedural justice of the
experience.8 In other words, people’s judgments about whether justice was done
are not strongly linked to their outcomes. Instead, they are linked to the process
that produces those outcomes.
Given the centrality of procedural justice to the exercise of legal authority,
my concern is with factors shaping the importance of procedural justice. In a
situation of the type Mnookin and Verbeke outline in their discussion of
Belgium, it is such factors that may well determine the ability of a society to
hold itself together. This comment focuses on two factors: identification and
legitimacy.
III
IDENTIFICATION
Most situations of conflict between groups, organizations, and societies
involve groups that are connected in some ways, but that are also distinct.
Those groups can view themselves as being in conflict, or they can view
themselves as cooperating. Diversity imposes special problems for group
leaders. This is the case because people’s loyalties to a larger (that is,
superordinate) group often conflict with their loyalties to ethnic, religious,
ideological, or other subgroups. For the larger group to be viable, leaders must
be able to gain support for common policies from the members of the various
groups within society.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Tom R. Tyler, Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure, 35 INT’L J. PSYCHOL. 117, 121 (2000).
Id. at 121–22.
Id. at 122.
Id.
Id.
TOM R. TYLER & YUEN J. HUO, TRUST IN THE LAW 49–58 (2002).
Id. at 58.
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Many social policies concerning immigrants and minorities have been based
upon untested assumptions about the consequences of different forms of loyalty
for the well-being of the state. For example, in the United States, the strong
emphasis on assimilation is based upon the belief that subgroup loyalties
threaten political and social stability.9 In general, loyalty to ethnic and cultural
subgroups is discouraged, while becoming an American is viewed as the central
goal.10
Recently, social-science research has suggested that superordinate
identification is important in shaping people’s political attitudes and actions,
whereas subgroup identification plays little role in relationships to
government.11 This finding suggests that, in many situations, it may well be
possible for societies to be tolerant of strong subgroup loyalties because it is the
level of identification with the superordinate group that shapes the basis of
deference.12
But why does superordinate identification matter? We can generally
identify two reasons that people might accept decisions and obey rules. One
reason is instrumental: people might do so when it favors them. A second
reason is relational: they might do so when they view the authorities and
institutions involved as making decisions in fair ways. Clearly, authorities would
rather have their constituents reacting to them relationally, since it gives them
the ability to better manage conflicts. The key finding is that when people
identify with the superordinate group, they react to decisions relationally.13
When they do not, they react instrumentally.14
So, in the studies by Smith and by Huo and myself, minorities who identified
with the superordinate group decided whether to defer to rules and authorities,
based upon the manner of their treatment by those authorities.15 Among
9. Yuen J. Huo, Procedural Justice and Social Regulation Across Group Boundaries: Does
Subgroup Identity Undermine Relationship Based Governance, 29 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
BULL. 336, 336 (2003).
10. Yuen J. Huo et al., Superordinate Identification, Subgroup Identification, and Justice Concerns:
Is Separatism the Problem? Is Assimilation the Answer?, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 40, 40 (1996).
11. For an examination of the basis of deference to decisions made by authorities in conflict
situations, see Huo et al., supra note 10, at 40–45. The argument has been extended to interactions
between ethnic groups and legal authorities. See, e.g., Huo, supra note 9, at 336–48; Heather J. Smith &
Tom R. Tyler, Justice and Power: When Will Justice Concerns Encourage the Advantaged to Support
Policies Which Redistribute Economic Resources and the Disadvantaged to Willingly Obey the Law?, 26
EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 171, 171–200 (1996).
12. Huo et al., supra note 10, at 40–45, examined the basis of deference to the decisions made by
authorities in conflict situations. Smith & Tyler, supra note 11, at 171–200, and Huo, supra note 9, at
336–48, extend this basic argument to interactions between minority group members and legal
authorities. In all cases the finding is the same.
13. Huo, supra note 9, at 345.
14. Smith & Tyler, supra note 11, at 193–94.
15. Huo et al., supra note 10, at 44–45; Smith & Tyler, supra note 11, at 185–86, 197–98; see also
John E. Transue, Identity Salience, Identity Acceptance, and Racial Policy Attitudes: American National
Identity as a Uniting Force, 51 AM. J. POL. SCI. 78, 78–91 (2007) (suggesting that making superordinate
identity relevant increased support for tax increases); Tom R. Tyler & Peter Degoey, Collective
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minorities with high superordinate identification, those treated fairly while
decisions were made about the implementation of rules accepted the decisions.16
When identification was low, acceptance was linked to the favorability of
decisions.17
The centrality of superordinate identification matters because we know a
great deal about how to create and maintain superordinate identification among
immigrants, minorities, and others. In particular, research emphasizes two
themes. First, superordinate identification can be strengthened by creating
opportunities for the members of different groups to work across group
boundaries to pursue commonly beneficial goals.18 Ever since the classic
Robbers Cave experiments by Sherif,19 the importance of interdependence has
been emphasized. This interdependence element of superordinate identification
is emphasized in the common in-group identity model.20 Second, when people
experience fair procedures on the part of group authorities, they more strongly
identify with the group.21 This includes fair procedures for decisionmaking and
fair interpersonal treatment, that is, treatment with dignity and respect,
acknowledgment of rights, et cetera.
IV
LEGITIMACY
A second mechanism that might be used to encourage cooperation is to
activate people’s feelings of responsibility and obligation to obey authorities.22
Legitimacy is the property of an authority or institution that leads people to feel
that that authority or institution is entitled to be deferred to and obeyed.23 It
represents an “acceptance by people of the need to bring their behavior into

Restraint in a Social Dilemma Situation: The Influence of Procedural Justice and Community
Identification on the Empowerment and Legitimacy of Authority, 69 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
482, 482–97 (1995) (suggesting that individuals increased their support for water-conservation decisions
when authorities use fair decisionmaking procedures).
16. Huo et al., supra note 10, at 44–45; Smith & Tyler, supra note 11, at 197–98; Tyler & Degoey,
supra note 15, at 493.
17. Huo et al., supra note 10, at 45; Smith, supra note 11, at 197–98; Tyler & Degoey, supra note 15,
at 493.
18. Tyler & Degoey, supra note 15, at 493–94.
19. MUZAFER SHERIF ET AL., INTERGROUP CONFLICT AND COOPERATION: THE ROBBERS CAVE
EXPERIMENT 208–11(1961).
20. Samuel L. Gaertner et al., Across Cultural Divides: The Value of a Superordinate Identity, in
CULTURAL DIVIDES 173, 182 (Deborah A. Prentice & Dale T. Miller eds., 1999).
21. TOM R. TYLER & STEVEN L. BLADER, COOPERATION IN GROUPS 194–96 (2000).
22. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW: PROCEDURAL JUSTICE, LEGITIMACY, AND
COMPLIANCE 19 (2006); see also Tom R. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives on Legitimacy and
Legitimation, 57 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 375, 375–400 (2006) [hereinafter Tyler, Psychological
Perspectives] (discussing legitimacy and how it affects personal feelings of obligation to defer to
authority); Tom R. Tyler, Procedural Justice, Legitimacy, and the Effective Rule of Law, 30 CRIME &
JUST. 283, 307–310 (2003).
23. Tyler, Psychological Perspectives, supra note 22, at 375.
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line with the dictates of an external authority.”24 This feeling of obligation is
linked not simply to the authorities’ possession of instruments of reward or
coercion, but also to properties of the authority that lead people to feel it is
entitled to be obeyed.25 As was true with identification, procedural justice is a
key antecedent of legitimacy.26 Hence, procedural justice in the exercise of
authority both increases identification with superordinate authorities and
promotes legitimacy.
V
CONCLUSION
Two factors—superordinate identity and legitimacy—aid in the
management of conflicts between groups, and both are encouraged by
procedural justice. Belgium, whose diversity motivated this discussion, is, from
a procedural-justice perspective, a fragile society. The public is largely excluded
from decisionmaking, which is primarily done by elites.27 Hence, the authorities
have very little legitimacy and must rely upon a complex arrangement of
providing benefits to different groups as the basis upon which they rule. Such an
arrangement is inherently unstable and at risk, which suggests that Belgium
itself is at risk.
Nonetheless, there is nothing inherently unstable about pluralistic societies.
We know a lot about how to enhance political stability via the mechanisms of
the fair exercise of authority, political and legal. By enhancing their own
legitimacy through such mechanisms and by strengthening the superordinate
identification of multiple and diverse groups, those in authority can enhance the
loyalty of those groups to the larger society and to the authorities, themselves.
This, in turn, facilitates governance.

24.
25.
26.
27.

TYLER, supra note 22, at 25.
TYLER, supra note 22, at 57.
Id. at 162.
Mnookin & Verbeke, supra note 1, at 173–74.

